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Carol Magai and Jeannette Haviland-Jones have written a patient,
systematic book about emotions and their role in development
throughout the lifespan. Addressing difficult questions—emotions in
personality, interaction, thinking and change—they also take the risk
of qualitative, person-centred case studies, analysing the life and work
of Carl Rogers, Robert Ellis and Fritz Perls. I will first summarize their
work and highlight some of their contributions. I will then pick on a
few difficulties. This will finally lead me to propose an additional
perspective on the data gathered by the authors.
Ideoaffective Systems in the Life-Course
The Hidden Genius of Emotions addresses the role of emotions in
people’s life and transitions; to do so, it proposes to consider psycho-
logical development in the light of a self-organizing systems approach.
In that perspective, changes within life-trajectories are possible in far-
from-equilibrium situations, which are not the result of stage changes
or clear-cut transitions. Drastic changes might be provoked by situ-
ations of ruptures in the course of events, but also by very tiny, 
imperceptible, events; these can slowly contribute to changes while
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reinforcing some tendencies, or constitute the ‘ultimate drop’ before a
dramatic disequilibrium. As an outcome, the person can change and
develop more complex strategies; but she or he can also not move and
rigidify existing patterns, or decompose and regress to more simple
ways to apprehend events. The outcomes of such moments are not pre-
dictable: many possibilities are offered, or closed; a given develop-
mental shift can be reached through different paths, and similar paths
can lead to very different results. Within this non-linear view on
development, the innovative stance of the authors is to propose that
outcomes of changes are facilitated, or constrained, not only by socio-
cultural contexts, interpersonal relationships or random events, but
also by personal emotional patterns:
Some emotional patterns seem, themselves, to set the boundaries conditions
for change, determining whether the self system is more of an open system
or a closed system in terms of intersubjectivity. That is, the type(s) of
emotion(s) in which an individual’s personality is grounded comprises a set
of parameters governing whether the system operates in a feedback or feed-
forward fashion. Particular emotions influence boundaries in certain ways.
(p. 465)
These emotional patterns are addressed through the notion of ‘idio-
affective biases’, which are at the heart of a person’s actions, feelings
and thoughts, in personal and interpersonal situations. The notion,
inspired by Tomkins’ ‘ideoaffective structures’ (see, e.g., Kosofsky &
Franck, 1995), designates
. . . filters and regulators of information and experience. They predispose
individuals to perceive the world in certain emotionally framed ways and
to assimilate information to pre-existing affect-laden schemas. They also
may prepare a particular course of action. Each person evolves particular
patterns of emotional bias in the course of development. (p. 11)
On this basis three theoretical questions are addressed:
How do ideoaffective structures develop in childhood and change across the
lifetime? How are ideoaffective structures seen in virtually every movement
of the individual—in the face, voice, posture, and bodily attitude? And how
do these expressive behaviours influence other people? How are ideoaffec-
tive structures integrated into intellectual work to provide focus on certain
content areas, to motivate styles of problem solving, or to block discovery
in some areas? (p. 19)
Methodologically, the authors work on case life-stories.1 To answer
their three questions, the authors propose first a psychobiography of
Rogers, Perls and Ellis—a story of their emotional development,
explained through their attachment story2 and significant reinforcing or
challenging events, creating privileged associations between situational
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patterns and emotions, or between emotions. Second, they analyse the
writings of these men, and identify different modalities of thought
structuring their work across their careers: an absolute logic (linear-
causal), a relativistic logic or a patterned thought—a type of thought
that emerges beyond relativistic logic, that proposes new arrangements
(dialogic thought is one type of patterned thought).3 In parallel, the
emotional vocabulary employed in these texts is analysed. This grounds
the exploration of three hypotheses about the links between emotion
and intellectual work: first, that ‘blocked or singular emotional invest-
ment in certain ideas leads to blocked or singular examinations of those
same issues’; second, ‘that the elaboration of certain ideas with a wide
variety of emotions leads to commitment to explore those ideas and rep-
resents a person’s best intellectual and creative efforts’, with the restric-
tion that these emotions ‘only when differentiated and organized with
different themes will lead to complex cognitive development’; and
third, that ‘changes in emotional experiences lead or are interrelated
with intellectual changes and changes in the issues that require com-
mitment’ (pp. 292–293). These propositions are challenging and inter-
esting, and contribute to a developmental psychology of thinking
beyond adolescence.
Third, an analysis of the filmed interactions of the three therapists
with the same patient is conducted to illustrate the hypothesis that the
ideoaffective system is diffracted and actualized in patterns of inter-
active behaviour, bodily micro-gestures or preferred linguistic terms,
and so on. This chapter, which could be read as a comparison between
therapeutic approaches, is important for rehabilitating qualitative
methodologies that are too rare in present psychology research; it offers
pages of precise verbal description of interactions, it highlights how
non-verbal attitudes model these, gives us substantial observation
tools, and grounds useful insights.
This book confronts the reader with challenging questions about
life-trajectories, and questions some theoretical and developmental
assumptions. Indeed, the unpredictability of actual periods of change
in one’s life, the interaction between emotional profile and professional
creation, or the durability of idioaffective patterns are disturbing ideas
in developmental research.
Attachment, Emotion and Cognition
There are some difficulties inherent in Magai and Haviland-Jones’
courageous inquiry. I will concentrate on two points, on which the
authors provide contradictory statements.4
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First, the attachment model (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall,
1978) grounds the whole approach, which raises problems—both
because of the difficulty of inferring early attachment styles on the
basis of external facts, testimonies and later behaviour (e.g. the fact
that Rogers’ mother must have given him some attention because of
his sicknesses, or the quality of his later marital relationship); and
because of the very partial material at hand. Such indices give a very
vague idea of the pattern and the quality of the attachment effectively
actualized.5 Magai and Haviland-Jones seem themselves ambivalent,
simultaneously using attachment style as a powerful explanatory tool,
and insisting on its limits—for example, proposing style variations
such as an ‘imperfectly secure attachment’ (p. 67), or, more important,
admitting that it can’t account for some observed changes in the
attachment patterns and the emotional structure. The question is: if,
as the authors propose, it is possible to infer one person’s early attach-
ment style from her or his later discourse or behaviour, it presupposes
that attachment style is constant; given that, then, attachment style
and emotional profile are closely connected, how can emotional
profile develop in time, given a specific, early attachment style? One
of the recent extensions of attachment research concerns the link
between attachment and symbolization development. Fonagy,
Gergely, Jurist and Target (2002) show that attachment contributes to
the construction of children’s ‘mentalization’ abilities—processes
allowing one to catch one’s own mental states—which will be the key
for further regulation of affects.6 Two aspects of a close relationship
contribute to it: mirroring activities of care-givers, which acknowledge
the child’s feelings and reflect these to her or him; and second-order
comments that parents bring to hold in mind such states of mind and
feelings. The child progressively internalizes these two movements
and might become able to do the same holding and reflecting upon,
and mentalization of her or his thoughts and feelings. Some authors
call ‘symbolization’ the same mentalization processes when these are
supported by a shared, symbolic mean, mediated by a bodily, pic-
torial, linguistic support or activity (Tisseron, 1999). Thus, affects do
not exist as such; to be part of one’s thought, they must be linked to
other representational elements through symbols, or semiotic tools
(Valsiner, 2001). Such symbolization abilities, constructed within an
attachment relationship, are important to discriminate between
imagination and real life, one’s own affects and those of others, and
connected to various forms of reflection (Fonagy et al., 2002). They are
the basis of humans’ uses of signs, theories and other symbolic human
constructions (Nelson, 2002). Finally, if symbolization is part of affect
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regulation, we might start to see how an attachment pattern might
evolve through time.
A second difficulty the authors face is how to give a suitable model
for emotions. Magai and Haviland-Jones aim at overcoming the Piaget-
ian division between emotions as the ‘energy force in mental life’ and
cognition as providing contents (p. 9),7 and propose to see them as
organizing principles (linking, categorizing) of thought; however, at
the end of the day, the authors state that,
. . . considered at least metaphorically as energies, each emotion contains a
rate or speed of process as a part of its definition—very fast for surprise, for
example. Emotions also contain a direction—approaching and uplifting in
the case of happiness. . . . Different emotions are more or less intra- and inter-
systematically open. Emotions such as anger, contempt, and disgust are
more refractory to change and inimical to creativity, especially, perhaps,
contempt and disgust. Others may be more conducive to change, such as
surprise. (pp. 465–466)
These concluding pages propose a ‘flow’ model of emotions8 at the
same time, emotions seem disconnected entities that can be classed in
typologies of which some are primary (after Tomkins, e.g. 1978/1995);
they are finally organized by ideoaffective structures, which are what
beds are for rivers—they create attractors and repellors for some types
of emotion, but can also be modified by them. When the issues debated
are cognition, professional activity and free-will in one’s lifespan, some
questions might be of interest: Are these emotions conscious or not?
Who labels them, and on what grounds? Do they need to be labelled
to be perceived? How embodied are these? What is intentional? Of
course, few satisfying theories of affects have been proposed in psy-
chology, and less have connected emotions with thinking (p. 329); still,
social psychologists, neuropsychologists,9 cultural psychologists and
psychoanalysts10 have contributed to the debate.
For example, post-Freudian psychoanalysis still works at develop-
ing an affect theory. In his current efforts to synthesize progresses in
the field, Green (1973/1999, 2000, 2002) sees affects as the dynamic,
working aspects of drives. Basically, provoked externally or internally,
affects can be seen as grounded in the bodily part of the experience,
which is beyond consciousness; then affects tend to diffuse through
different layers of the psyche. In the unconscious, they can be con-
nected to representations of things (mnemonic traces), and progres-
sively in representations of words (or symbolic means allowing
reflectivity), which can be linked in the consciousness through
symbolic forms.11 Affects can be more dangerous for the production of
thought if they subsist without being attached to any representations,
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not acknowledged as such—they can become cleaved, like in the case
of trauma, which causes a zone of avoidance of thinking, or they can
be discharged through acting-out or somatization. Once an affect is
linked and dynamizes representation, the affect-and-representation
can be repressed or transformed to be consciously tolerable, and this
can in turn modify deeper memory. Affects can also have functions of 
signalization (Green, 2002; Tisseron, 1996) of these various psychic 
processes.
Such a model also accounts for variations in thinking modes.
Thought is possible and creative if a double linkage is made: between
embodied affects and representation that might be mentally graspable;
and between representations charged or moved by affects, in the chain
of representation that constitutes thought. Weaknesses at these two
levels of linkages account for different modalities of talking-and-
thinking: language that follows logical rules but whose thoughts have
not been loaded by, or whose dynamic is not moved by, affects can
seem ‘rational’ but without any representativity toward deeper psychic
or bodily reality; thought or language that lets affects emerge unlinked
to symbolic representation—diffusing along thought, following free
association—can be inconstant, fragmented and explosive. Finally,
complex and creative thinking processes, requiring this double link,
suppose a harmonization between associations moved by logics of
affects and mastered by logical principles; such harmonization is much
facilitated by the uses of symbolic tools.12
Affects are thus not only flows; they can also leave traces in the
memory, and link memory to the present. They are not exactly
representations either; they have dynamizing and signalling, organiz-
ing and linking functions. Affects are more or less conscious, and the
less conscious they are, the less controllable and linkable to symbolic
means these will be; their power of diffusion upon thought and
language, their distorting force in the case of a traumatic event, will be
much less apprehensible, but such distortions might be observable
through distortions of behaviour, thought and speech (Green, 1992).
At this point, we can reconnect attachment and affect theories
through the notion of symbolization, and see them in a developmental
perceptive. If attachment can tell us something about how someone is
going to think, and if unlinked affects can disturb ways of thinking, it
is because attachment is crucial for the elaboration of the symbolic
function, and because symbolic thinking processes are at the heart of
the regulation, the transformation and the interpretation of affects. It
is largely admitted that pure affect, unanalysed, unlinked, is highly 
disruptive in thought and action (Bion, 1977; Winnicott, 1971/2001).13
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On the other hand, a theory of symbolization is necessary to explain
how affects are linkable, mentally graspable or even consciously
known and progressively modified, how they can be integrated in
thought and language, shaping behaviour and interpersonal relation-
ships, and, in turn, changing one’s memories and affecting regulation
abilities. We can now turn to the question of symbolic mediation of
such processes in affective phenomena.
Uses of Symbolic Resources in Affect Elaboration
To try to overcome some difficulties met by Magai and Haviland-Jones,
I will focus on cultural resources in development, for these can facili-
tate and orient symbolization processes, that is, they can mediate regu-
lation or elaboration of affects in life-changes.
Focusing on one of Magai and Haviland-Jones’s case studies, I will
summarize their analysis of Rogers’ (1972) autobiographical essay, and
complete it with my reading of the same text with a focus on cultural
elements. Cultural elements are here a shared, visible (audible)
ensemble of symbols, encapsulating previous meanings or experiences
of persons (experiences of various persons minimally overlap at this
symbolic point) (Cole, 1996). I will consider the place of two types of
cultural elements in Rogers’ life: closed, materially bounded organized
systems of symbols, such as books; and cultural elements belonging to
more distributed, socially regulated symbolic systems, such as a
religious system. Cultural elements can be said to be ‘used’ 14 when
they become symbolic resources—what turns a symbolic element into
a resource is both the fact of being used for something, for a given
person, intending doing something, at a given personal, socio-
historical location, and its extraction out of its context of normal use (a
novel is normally read; it can also be used, however, as a model by
which to raise children [Zittoun, 2001] ). By using symbolic resources,
a person can come to materially and mentally grasp and manipulate
symbolic forms that offer ways to facilitate symbolization processes.
As will become clear in the case of Rogers, uses of symbolic resources
can mediate symbolization processes that can enable actions, learning,
identity changes, emotional elaboration and constructions of meaning.
In the authors’ account, Carl Rogers is described as having been a
baby receiving good attention, developing an almost secure attach-
ment, experiencing a first disenchantment at the birth of a sibling, 
and growing up in a pragmatic family retaining its emotionality. As
an obedient child, hiding his anger, he would stay home when
required and he developed no friends. A compensation is said to have
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been literature; quoting Rogers: ‘I was buried in books—stories of
Indian and frontiers [or also] the encyclopaedia or the dictionary’, the
Girl of the Limberlost and books about nature (Rogers, 1972, in Magai &
Haviland-Jones, p. 69). For the authors, Rogers’ readings substituted
for human beings; they where a constant way to escape while in reality
his family was moving and he had to change schools. Rogers was also
raised in a religious family, whose ‘fundamentalist’ climate, according
to the authors, provoked disgust.15 In the authors’ view, these experi-
ences account for Rogers’s underlying revulsion, later noticeable in the
way he would reject colleagues not sharing his interests. Also, Rogers
used ‘intellectual resources’ (p. 70) to escape his disenchanted situ-
ation, finding ways to deal with the contempt developed through
religious education and isolation. Finally, his emotional profile is
described to be one of ‘interest and joy’, ‘shame and disgust’, and an
‘undeveloped anger’ (pp. 229–230). His ability to be surprised accounts
for his later ‘wisdom’ and his ability to move from a quite mechanis-
tic style of thinking to a more dialectical one. The description and
interpretation of Magai and Haviland-Jones are patiently constructed
and based on concomitant facts. However, to contribute to the idea that
an understanding of affect and thinking would gain from considering
questions of mediated symbolization, I will explore the question of the
uses of symbolic resources in Rogers’ development and affective life.
Looking at Rogers’ life (Rogers, 1972), we can read another develop-
mental story. At an early age he was involved in close learning inter-
actions that were strongly emotionally marked (Tomasello, 1999). For
example, he not only learned to read early, but especially read the Bible
until he went to school, aged seven. We could imagine that the caring
mother of the sickly Rogers spent a lot of time telling or reading him
biblical stories; this heavy and austere set of dramatic stories might
have been the form through which the tenderness and the preoccu-
pation of the mother were addressed to Rogers. This experience of the
importance of a strongly invested, culturally mediated relationship
might then have been transposed when entering school; very soon,
Rogers states, he fell in love with his young, feminine school teachers;
in a schematic way, he could be said to have, at an early stage, internal-
ized a strongly invested triangle—Rogers, a caring woman and a book,
sustaining his interest in this third term. The emotional tie might have
coloured his relationship to cultural elements, and his later internal-
ization of the role of teachers triggering curiosity. It is also of note that
Rogers’ mother used to comment on real events with Bible quotations;
she was thus bridging real situations with biblical ones, using the latter
to illuminate the former.
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Later, though an excellent student, Rogers was absent-minded at
school. He seems to have been a child with a deep and rapid intelli-
gence, quick to be bored. His ‘escapes’ into Indian stories and the
encyclopaedia might be seen as ways to sustain his curiosity and his
thinking abilities and provide them with some material, so as to avoid
apathy. We might also imagine that in part, these imaginary experi-
ences offered a space in which emotions and affects could be lived-out
when they were not allowed in real, social life (aggressivity, taste for
revenge, desire to know). Some authors would see here a cathartic use
of the novel; rather, it seems that a non-real space (known as such) is
offered in which to live, explore and master real, authentic affects
(Freud, 1908/2001b, 1914/2001c; Harris, 2000; Tisseron, 2002; Vygotsky,
1931/1994; Winnicott, 1971/2001).
The fact that Rogers gives a quite detailed list of the most important
books read during his formative years also suggests that these might
have played a role in his development; although what follows is
necessarily speculative, it might be of interest to explore possible
relations between the imaginary triggered by these books and Rogers’
real life. For example, after Rogers’ passion for Indian novels, his
family moved to a country house, where 
. . . to play in the woods (the ‘forest’ for me) and to learn the birds and
animals was bringing my frontier stories to life. Many of the Indians I have
crept up on, all unsuspecting, in those wooded glades. What if they were
only imaginary? (Rogers 1972, p. 33)
It seems that the novels-mediated imaginary experiences of Rogers
allowed him to face not a strange, unknown environment, but rather
a place he had (as it were) already explored in imagination; this
imaginary life seems to have been superimposed upon the real one, as
a way to place transparent guidelines on it; the life there, its laws, its
animals and vegetation, were somehow already domesticated. It is as
if the novel pre-formed Rogers’ perception, prepared him for some
events that might happen, reducing anxieties that a foreign, unpre-
dictable place might cause. It also added to the country house a
perfume of magic and adventure: although Rogers’ Indians were
imaginary, it allowed him to transform a few banal trees in a deep
dream-like field. Rather than words composing a novel having the
echoes of their previous social insertions (Bakhtin, 1986), it is as if the
real-life components come alive with the echoes of the imaginary. 
The articulation between imaginary and reality takes other forms.
The Girl of the Limberlost, a novel by Gene Stratton-Porter, amateur
entomologist, created in Rogers ‘a responsive mood’ (Rogers, 1972,
9
p. 33) that allowed him to see moths in a tree, which he brought home
and raised. Under the guidance of this cultural resource, he became a
passionate ‘little scientist’,16 raising caterpillars, and using specialized
literature for this. Owing to its semantic content, its structure or its
emotional qualities, this cultural element awoke some ‘resonance’ in
Rogers; it changed his perception of the real world, and then could be
used to acquire knowledge and skills to be applied to reality, where
they guided actions. We might also think that, given his family’s agri-
cultural exploitation, Rogers was already acquainted with systematic
planning and animal care; his scientific game and education might
have been a playful way to reappropriate, to make personally
meaningful and interesting, the adults’ farming work (Furth, 1987;
Piaget, 1945/1951).
Sent to work manually in a quite remote area during the summer,
the adolescent Rogers became a passionate reader of Victor Hugo,
Dickens, Emerson, Carlyle, Poe, and so on. Retrospectively, he judged
himself as having been living in a world of his own. However, these
chosen readings are not the easiest ones: they introduce the reader to
the complexity of human life and to the cruelty of fates; they show the
best and the darkest of human deeds and thoughts, how much is
beyond mastery, and how small events can change a life-course. For
these features, we might see in these books some transpositions of the
power of Rogers’ childhood biblical narrative into socio-historically
and politically located drama. If one takes seriously that imaginary
experiences allow ‘real’ emotions to be symbolized, they offer
powerful ways to explore possible situations not offered in everyday
life and to feel the particular emotional movements and experiment
with consequences that they might generate. Furthermore, complex
novels can be powerful symbolic resources for the elaboration of
affects:17 they can awaken and animate diffuse feelings, distribute and
attach them to different characters, aspects of the landscapes or poetic
sentences; once loaded with the reader’s affects, novels can then follow
complex narrative paths, operating slow reorganizations of represen-
tations, and, in turn, of these affects. We can wonder how much these
specific readings increased Rogers’ interest in humankind, its failures
and its perfectibility—that is to say, how much they shaped the
psychologist to be. If these readings played an important role, such
symbolic resources had two types of outcome: the exploration of
emotions, and, maybe, the countenance and the transformation of 
anxieties Rogers might have had as an adolescent; and the facilitation
of Rogers’ reflection upon himself and his interests, in the sense of an
identity redefinition.
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The role of the Bible as a symbolic resource is probably more
complex than we have the means to analyse. However, we can recall
that after having first thought of starting agricultural studies, Rogers
chose a religious career.18 When he later abandoned this religious
project, his link with Christian life was not cut. We can imagine that
his religious, emotionally invested background still shaped some
actions and thoughts; it might be that the uses of its symbolic resources
changed through time. In his youth, it was through his belonging to
religious organizations that Rogers developed good social skills. Also,
‘chosen’ at a national level to go to China, Rogers said he developed a
sense of exception—which might have had some resonance with
earlier readings of lonely heroes or with the trajectory of Christ.
Leaving his religious path against some social expectations must have
been a hard decision; again symbolic means of this type might have
supported him. In effect, as offering forms of semiotic regulations, uses
of symbolic resources can support the progressive construction of tem-
porary definitions, ‘quasi-aims’, possible paths to the future (Josephs,
1998), provisory meanings, leading to some actions (Valsiner, 1998) in
some blurred or uncertain situations, such as the one caused by doubts
about one’s career. Symbolic resources might confer a temporary
reassurance and stability to the oscillation between actions and aims,
experiences and personal meanings (Zittoun, Duveen, Gillespie,
Ivinson, & Psaltis, 2003). Finally, beyond Rogers’ interest in human
failure and its perfectibility through therapy, his later professional work
is shaped by a rigorous sense of ethics: a respect for others’ opinions; a
radical refusal of any corruption in academic politics. The use of
symbolic resources is subtle—it is as if earlier uses had left traces in
Rogers’ more durable values. Hence we might suggest that Rogers’ link
to religious cultural elements and his uses of symbolic resources moved
through different layers of his life, having different degrees of general-
ity: heavily emotionally loaded, they mediated the mother–child
relationship; the Bible offered the first imaginary explorations in child-
hood; they allowed shared ritualized practices in family and church and
their related feelings of communion; they nourished an interest for
religion, history, philosophy and knowledge about the ‘meaning of life’;
they became a social mediation to join communities of young people in
the YMCA and to discover China; and, finally, they grounded an over-
arching, very general, abstract ethical orientation system.
In conclusion, if we want to summarize the link between symbolic
resources and affects, we might first see how affects guide one’s choice
of privileged resources. Given some sociocultural, historical, practical
and economical constraints, Rogers had no choice but to be confronted
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with the Bible. He later started to choose his readings, and emotional
resonance is one of the grounds upon which we choose a book,
together with resonance in contents (thematic, semantic) or structure
(Zittoun, 2001). Affects also mediate one’s acquaintance with other
persons or social groups that might introduce one to given cultural
elements. Second, being complex combinations and assemblages of
symbols, symbolic resources have the power to facilitate symboliza-
tion, ‘fixing’ affects and unformed memories into shared symbolic
forms that are personally loaded. They thus re-present one’s own
memories in another form (Valsiner, 2001), or mediate reflectivity, and
thus, linking images and affects, can facilitate thinking processes
(Fonagy, 2003; Tisseron, 1999). These processes can occur within sen-
tences, stories, pictures or movies, where they are part of wider
evolving narrative, are transformed, decomposed and reassembled—
and such movements might facilitate one’s internal ‘working through’
of affects. These linkage and elaboration processes of affects allow
them to be integrated into symbolized memories, and this integration
prevents affects from harming or distorting thought. In that sense,
symbolic resources modify one’s modes of thinking. Third, symbolic
resources allow explorations of possible worlds, beyond what is given
to one’s immediate experience; they facilitate playing with hypo-
thetical futures and changing perspectives upon the past; they can
facilitate exploration of the range of affects one has to avoid in real life,
and reduce anxieties due to uncertainties. In sum, symbolizing pro-
cesses, as means to integrate past experiences and affects, and symbolic
resources, which allow safe exploration of affects under new patterns
of events, can both participate in one’s reshaping and modification of
ideoaffective biases, and have consequences in one’s choices, way of
thinking and actions. Through Rogers’ life-story, we saw the trajectory
of a man who, having been taught early on to link the real and the
imaginary through the mediation of symbolic elements, was able to
find symbolic resources in cultural elements at his disposal, which he
used in different ways—to acquire knowledge, construct meanings,
define values, regulate emotion, redefine himself in relationship to
others; he became able to acquire deeper understandings and
emotional richness after extensive life changes.
The Hidden Genius as a Symbolic Resource
As a complex cultural artefact, The Hidden Genius of Emotions offers 
the reader a challenging journey through ideoaffective systems in the
life of three scholars of the psyche. Hence the resonance this book
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awakened in me triggered new questions; used as a symbolic resource,
it contributed to the reshaping of my understanding of affects and
development; it encouraged me to explore some of the pathways it
indicates, and to add a contribution to the important issues raised by
Carol Magai and Jeannette Haviland-Jones.
Notes
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1. The choice of the subjects is justified, first, by the fact that the three men
seem to come from comparable religiously aware, middle-class families,
in the same historical period; all grew up in relatively difficult conditions.
Since such ‘sociological’ description cannot account for the differences in
the therapeutic models elaborated by them, Magai and Haviland-Jones
can follow the exploratory hypothesis that ideoaffective structures explain
these differences. Another justification is linked to the availability of
documentation about each man—autobiographies, scientific texts and a
movie showing interactions of these three men with the same patient,
offering material for the analysis.
2. Based on Bowlby and developed by Main, Ainsworth and her
collaborators (1978) have observed and described three styles of
attachment—secure, ambivalent or avoidant—that are constructed
through early interactions between a child and her or his caregiver.
Among them, a ‘secure attachment’, based on a certain quality of
caregiver–child attunement allowing the child to ‘know’ that the caregiver
will be there when needed, is said to provide the better base for ulterior
exploration of the world and thus for development.
3. This distinction allows for the gradation of achieved development, for it
seems assumed by the authors that the third type of thought is far more
complex than the first one.
4. There are other problems. Some are due to the fact the authors’ project
brought them beyond expectations—which is rather laudable—causing
some notional imprecision. Others are more problematic: one is that the
authors use assertions taken from Tomkins’ work to justify
interpretations, often lacking grounding (e.g. the explanatory power of the
notion of ‘disenchantment’, which might have caused the ‘disgust’
characterizing Roger’s emotional profile—given that ‘disgust is a reaction
generated when “something that was once good turns bad” ’ (p. 66: Carl
Rogers, as a sick child deserving the attention of his mother, lost it at the
birth of a younger sibling). This uncritical use of quotation might be
connected to a hidden agenda of the book, which is to account for
Tomkins’ intuitive emotional understanding, for which the authors have a
huge admiration (pp. 3, 434).
5. Moreover, it seems that the studies assessing adult attachment styles use a
quite precise procedure (AAI), which can, for example, predict the
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maternal behaviour of a pregnant mother (e.g. Ammaniti, Candelori, Pola,
& Tambelli, 1999), but usually with the awareness that the memories
actualized during such an interview might reflect the present attachment
model, not the previous, child’s one. The authors ignore these problems,
which is regrettable, given the importance of attachment in the authors’
interpretations of the three psychologists’ lives.
6. From here on, I will prefer the term ‘affects’ to ‘emotion’, the former being
more generic, including feelings, passions, and does not need to be
recognized and labelled as such by a speaker (Green, 1973/1999; Valsiner,
2001).
7. Actually, Piaget (1945/1951) also mentions ‘affective schemes’.
8. It is very difficult to depart form a ‘hydraulic model’ of emotions, which
has also been used by Freud and Piaget; as others have shown, it seems to
be inherent in the embodiment of our language (Lakoff, 1987). However, if
we accept that emotions flow along certain patterns, so shall we consider
thoughts.
9. For a discussion of the link between developmental psychology,
psychoanalysis, cultural psychology and recent neuroscientific research,
see, respectively, Fonagy et al. (2002), Green (2002) and Benson (2001).
10. Freud, who did not reduce affects to drives (p. 8, after Tomkins), has left a
confusing heritage about affects—considering them at times as one part of
the dynamic Id, strongly connected to the soma, and at times more as
signals (see Rapaport, 1953/1967, or Fonagy et al., 2002, and Green, 2002,
for recent discussions).
11. These linking activities might be, ontogenetically, close to the mentalizing
abilities mentioned above (Fonagy, 2003).
12. Green proposed to see in such a harmonization ‘tertiary’ processes: it links
primary processes (logic of thought association following free, 
affect-laden association, condensation and displacement) and secondary
processes (thought organized after logico-discursive laws), following
Freud’s propositions (1900/2001a).
13. It is thus rather to deplore that the authors seem to fear the notion of
symbolization, as if having necessarily a bias for rationalization.
14. The metaphoric notion of ‘use’ in a psychological sense has a double root,
in Vygotsky’s and Winnicott’s approaches. The ‘use’ of symbolic elements
draws on Vygotsky’s idea of ‘using’ symbolic realities—language—as
tools to form and channel thoughts (with a reciprocal co-dependency
between language and thought—one always escaping the other)
(Vygotsky, 1962). Another root of the notion of use is to be found in
Winnicott’s work: an object that can be used is an object given by the
environment, the reality-status of which does not need to be clarified, but
which allows things to be done, which are mainly related to ‘emotional’
and identity development. One can ‘use’ an object, the image of someone,
a sentence, a frame, a cultural thing, and so on, to be certain of existence,
to find a sense of unity and continuity through time, to rearrange one’s
own understanding about something, to symbolize one’s feelings, to
extend ones human experiences, notably through ‘experiences by proxy’,
and so on (Winnicott, 1968/1989, 1971/2001).
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15. This is supported by the example of biblical quotes Rogers mentions when
explaining how his mother mentioned a lot of these: ‘Come out from
among them and be ye separate’ and ‘all our righteousness is a filthy rags
in thy sight, oh Lord’ (Rogers, 1972, in Magai and Haviland-Jones, p. 69).
16. An entomologist, as Piaget did (Barrelet & Perret-Clermont, 1996)—but in
a less systematic way, probably owing to a lack of proper social support.
17. This is possible under some conditions—one of these is related to the too
strong presence of unlinked affects or limited symbolization abilities
(Fonagy, 2003; Tisseron, 1999). This can lead some people to have
difficulty connecting imaginary experiences and real ones—what is lived
in the ‘imaginary’ stays there, either because it is preferable to the real, or
because it allows one to get rid of unpleasant memories or emotions
(Zittoun, 2001, 2002)—which doesn’t seem to be the case for Rogers, who
underlines the connections between the two spaces.
18. He changed his mind after a trip to China organized by Christian
organizations, where he met other significant adults, on the ground that
questions that interested him—such as what human life was about—
should not be answered by a unique, closed set of beliefs.
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